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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to present a comprehensive, multi-regional trade model which
includes all types of state trading enterprises (STEs) as well as other domestic and trade policies.
The model is applied to measure the effects of STEs on the world wheat sector, where exports
and imports by STEs are dominant.  The STE model is based on a trade and policy simulation
model by Maeda, Suzuki, and Kaiser (MSK).  The MSK model is a nonlinear imperfectly
competitive spatial equilibrium model formulated as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP).
The MSK model can be used to evaluate the following various trade and domestic support
policies: specific duties, ad valorem tariffs, tariff-rate quotas, export subsidies, production
subsidies, production quotas, consumption taxes and price floors, combined with various
imperfectly competitive market structures.  However, it does not explicitly incorporate STEs.
We incorporate both Canadian and Australian types of exporting STEs into the model.
Importing STEs, like the Japanese Food Agency, are treated as specific duties in the model since
their mark-ups are imposed on imports within tariff-rate quotas.  In addition, we introduce
Chinese and Indian STEs (COFCO and FCI) which act as an exclusive importer and prohibit
exports.  The effects of relaxing the export prohibition due to China’s entry to the WTO is one of
the focal points to be analyzed. The main empirical findings are as follows.  In the base case
where all STEs are active with the committed 2000 levels remaining the same, Canada, the
United States, the European Community, and Australia would be the largest net exporters.  By
explicitly incorporating the roles of the CWB and AWB into the world wheat trade model,
Canadian and Australian net exports became larger than previous estimates.  Hence, it is
important to include STEs in trade simulation models.  In the case where CWB is no longer a
monopoly buyer of domestic wheat, compared to the base case, Canada would reduce exports,
increase domestic sales, and therefore reduce imports.  While the European Community,
Australia, and Argentina would increase net exports, only the United States would decrease net
exports because decreases in Canada’s imports results in a decrease in the United States’ exports
to Canada.  Under the scenario where the CWB and AWB are eliminated, Canada would reduce
net exports.  The largest gains of eliminating the CWB and AWB would go to the European
Community in the form of increased exports, while other exporters would have only minor
increases in net exports.  Interestingly, there would be almost no changes in Australia’s situation
after eliminating AWB.  This is partly because the AWB was already deregulated in 1997 and it
is no longer a monopoly buyer of domestic wheat.  Also, there would be only small differences
in Canada’s situation between a case assuming the CWB with no monopoly buying right and a
complete elimination of the CWB.   These results imply that being a monopoly buyer is more
important for the exporting STE than only being a monopoly exporter.  The simulation results
also revealed that export prohibition by COFCO and FCI would have almost no effects on world
wheat trade.  
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Measuring the Effects of Eliminating State Trading Enterprises on the World Wheat Sector
One of the most controversial issues in the new World Trade Organization (WTO) agricultural
concerns state trading enterprises (STEs).1  There are two types of STEs: exporting and
importing STEs.  Examples of exporting STEs include the Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC),
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), Australian Dairy Corporation (ADC), Australian Wheat Board
(AWB), and the New Zealand Dairy Board (NZDB).  The most important role of these
enterprises is the implementation of price discrimination between domestic and export markets to
maximize the total sales values for the country’s producers.  When there are higher domestic
prices, lower export prices, and pooled revenues distributed to farmers, the system is equivalent
to an export subsidy.2  Another type of price discrimination practice by exporting STEs is to
export the same quality goods at different prices between countries in the world market in order
to maximize pooled total revenues from export markets.  Although private export firms’ price
discrimination of this kind is not prohibited, the practice certainly decreases world economic
welfare if the discriminated price gap is larger than the difference explained by transportation
costs.  STEs with the monopoly right for buying and selling domestic products, e.g., Canadian
STEs, can exercise both of the above price discrimination practices with pooling schemes.  
However, exporting STEs such as the AWB can exercise only the practices between export 
markets because Australian STEs are no longer monopoly buyers in the domestic market.  Since
deregulation occurred in 1997, Australian producers can sell their products to domestic buyers
                                           
1 The state-owned or private enterprises exporting or importing by the single desk are referred to as STEs in this
paper.  The term, single desk, means the authorized exclusive right for monopoly trading.
2 Indeed, the CDC’s “special” milk class system, which creates substantially lower prices for milk used for exporting
products, was already judged to be equivalent to an export subsidy by the WTO court.  Legal questions still remain
as to whether other exporting STEs such as the CWB, ADC, AWB, and NZDB are exempted from rules for
reducing export subsidy schemes under the WTO agreements. 
2other than STEs.  Opponents of exporting STEs argue the above price discrimination practices
are “hidden” export subsidies and should be included in the “yellow box” supports, which must
be reduced according to the WTO agreements.
Importing STEs are designed to restrict imports into a country.  Examples of importing
STEs include the Japanese Food Agency, the China National Cereals, Oils & Foodstuffs Import
& Export Corporation (COFCO), and the Indian Food Corporation (FCI).  Some importing STEs
impose mark-ups on imports within tariff-rate quotas. The WTO has ruled that the mark-ups
imposed by importing STEs are equivalent to tariffs, which are already regulated under the
agreements.
To examine the impacts of various options to regulate STEs in the WTO agreements, a
comprehensive world trade policy simulation model is necessary for measuring the alternative
policy impacts.   Several models have been used to measure the effects of STEs on world
agricultural trade (e.g., Alston and Gray, Brooks and Schmitz, Carter, Loyns and Berwald,
Fulton, Larue and Veeman, McCorriston and MacLaren, Schmitz and Gray, and Suzuki and
Kaiser).  However, some of these models incorporate only price discrimination between
domestic and export sales, while some incorporate only price discrimination between different
export markets.  Some models incorporate Canadian-type STEs, but not Australian-type, and
none of them incorporate importing STEs.  Moreover, most models have only two regions: one
country and the rest of world.  The previous models have not incorporated a comprehensive set
of domestic and trade policies, or transportation costs.  There have been no comprehensive,
multi-regional policy simulation models that can simultaneously analyze various STE types.  
The objective of this paper is to present a comprehensive, multi-regional trade model
which includes all types of STEs as well as other domestic and trade policies.  The model is
3applied to measure the effects of STEs on the world wheat sector where exports and imports by
STEs are dominant.  The STE model is based on a trade and policy simulation model by Maeda,
Suzuki, and Kaiser (MSK).  The MSK model is a nonlinear imperfectly competitive spatial
equilibrium model formulated as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP).  The MSK model
can be used to evaluate the following various trade and domestic support policies: specific
duties, ad valorem tariffs, tariff-rate quotas, export subsidies, production subsidies, production
quotas, consumption taxes and price floors, combined with various imperfectly competitive
market structures.  However, it does not explicitly incorporate STEs.  We incorporate both
Canadian and Australian types of exporting STEs into the model.  Importing STEs, like the
Japanese Food Agency, are treated as specific duties in the model since their mark-ups are
imposed on imports within tariff-rate quotas.  In addition, we introduce Chinese and Indian STEs
(COFCO and FCI) which act as an exclusive importer and prohibit exports.  The effects of
relaxing the export prohibition due to China’s entry to the WTO is one of the focal points to be
analyzed.    
The STE model
Assumptions
Consider international trade among n  ( 2≥n ) countries.  In each country, there are three
administratively different markets:  (1) a domestic market with no tariffs, (2) an in-quota import
market with lower tariffs, i.e., the so-called minimum or current access market, and (3) an over-
quota import market with higher tariffs.  Products in the three markets are not differentiated by
consumers, i.e., there is only one demand function in each country.  Consumers in each country
are assumed to behave as price-takers.  
4STEs are classified into three types: Australian, Canadian, and Chinese.  The
Australian-type STE is a Cournot player acting as a consignment seller of the commodity in both
the domestic and export markets.  The STE pools all returns and distributes them back to
perfectly competitive producers.  The Cournot player maximizes profits with the expectation that
his rivals will not change their supply in response to changes in his supply.  While the
Australian-type STE is an exclusive exporter, it is not an exclusive buyer because producers are
allowed to sell to other buyers in the market.  Similar to the Australian STE, the Canadian-type
STE is also is a Cournot player acting as a consignment seller of the commodity in both the
domestic and export markets.  However, unlike the Australian-type STE, the Canadian-type STE
is an exclusive buyer of domestic products as well as an exclusive exporter.  The Chinese-type
STE is an exclusive importer, but has no market power over import and domestic prices.  It does
not export any products and prohibits producers’ exports.  Because the mark-ups imposed by the
Japanese STE is equivalent to specific duties on in-quota imports, no special category of STE is
considered here.  
Producers in countries without STEs are classified into two types:  (1) price-taking
producers, and (2) producers behaving as Cournot players.  All demand and cost functions are
assumed to be continuously differentiable.  It is also assumed that unit transportation costs are
constant regardless of quantity shipped, and there is no forwarding transportation between
countries.
Notations
Notations used in this paper are as follows:
Y : quantity produced;
fdX : quantity supplied from producers to domestic market in a country with STE;
5fgX : quantity supplied from producers to STE;
dX : quantity supplied from STE or producers to domestic market;
pX : quantity exported to in-quota market;
sX : quantity exported to over-quota market;
epX : quantity exported with export subsidy to in-quota market;
esX : quantity exported with export subsidy to over-quota market;
mX : quantity imported by STE;
P : market price;
PP : STE’s pooled price;
W : STE’s import price;
( )YCC = : cost function;
( )PDD = : demand function;
pST : in-quota specific duty rate;
sST : over-quota specific duty rate;
pAT : in-quota ad valorem tariff rate;
sAT : over-quota ad valorem tariff rate;
pX : tariff-rate quota;
ES : specific export subsidy;
eX : upper limit of subsidized quantity exported;
PS : (specific) producer subsidy;
Y : production quota;
P : price floor;
6CT : (ad valorem) consumption tax rate;
TC : unit transportation cost between countries;
dTC : unit transportation cost inside the country;
where sp STST <  and sp ATAT < .  Subscripts, h, i, j and k are put on the above notations.
Subscripts h and j indicate producing and consuming areas in countries with exporting STEs,
respectively.  Both producing and consuming areas in countries with importing STEs are
indicated by k.  Subscripts i and j indicate producing and consuming areas in countries with no
STEs, respectively.  Subscript i in ijX  means “from i ” and j in ijX  means “to j.”  Subscripts, h,
i, j and k are natural numbers.  
Necessary Conditions for Profit Maximization of the Australian-Type STE and Producers with
the STE
Using the above notation, the constrained optimization problem for the Australian-type STE’s in
country h can be expressed as:
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hkX , and
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hkX  are non-negative variables.  Values
for dhjTC ( )jh ≠  and hhTC  are set at extremely large numbers in order that
d
hjX ( )jh ≠ , phhX , shhX , ephhX , and eshhX  be zero.  In the case where countries j and k do not have the
tariff-rate quota system, values for pST , pAT , and pX  are zero, and over-quota tariff rates,
sST  and sAT , are applied to all imports to the country.  
The Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for the above maximization problem can be
expressed as follows:
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marginal revenues by country h’s STE in country j and k’s markets, respectively.  The relation
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dW  holds because { }kk PW =  as shown later.  hα , hjβ , hkβ , and hγ  are the Lagrange
multipliers for the above four constraints in the problem (1), respectively.  For country h's STE,
hjβ  and hkβ  are the shadow prices for the right to export the in-quota markets in countries j and
k, respectively.  Assuming that the market for this right is perfectly competitive in countries j and
k, producers in all countries should face the same shadow price for this right in countries j and k.
Throughout this paper, the competitive shadow price in countries j and k is expressed as jβ  and
kβ , respectively.  A relatively high shadow price means more expansion of tariff-rate quotas in
countries j and k is demanded.  The parameter hγ  is the shadow prices for the right for country
h’s STE to export within the upper limit of subsidized quantity exported in country h,
respectively.  
Theoretically, introducing the conjectural variations concept into the above model can
generalize the model to incorporate any degree of market structure from perfect competition to
monopoly.  However, conjectural variations in the generalized model cannot be estimated in the
same manner as Suzuki, Lenz and Forker, in cases where pX , sX , epX  and esX  are zero, and
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tariff-rate quotas and limits of subsidized quantity exported are effective.  Therefore, we use the
above model without introducing conjectural variations, and find plausible market structures by
simulating a lot of combinations of producers’ marketing behavior according to Kawaguchi,
Suzuki and Kaiser.  
Profits earned by the STE are returned to producers using the pooled price defined by
the following equation: 
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Producers sell their products to either the STE or the domestic market j with the pooled price and
the domestic market price given.  Profit maximization behavior of producers with Australian-
type STE in country h can be expressed as the following constrained optimization problem:
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hjX are non-negative variables.  A value for 
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large numbers in order that fdhjX ( jh ≠ ) be zero.  The Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for the
above maximization problem can be expressed as follows:
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where fhα  and hδ  are the Lagrange multipliers for the above two constraints in the problem (16),
respectively.  Condition (19) shows that the relation 

 =−+ fhhh
h
h PS
dY
dC αδ  holds if there is any
production in country h.  hδ  is the shadow prices for the right to produce within production
quotas in country h.  
Necessary Conditions for Profit Maximization of the Canadian-Type STE and Producers with the
STE
The Canadian-type STE’s profit maximizing behavior is the same as the Australian-type STE’s.
Therefore, necessary conditions for the Canadian-type STE’s profit maximization are also
expressed by conditions (2) to (14).  However, unlike the Australian-type STE case, producers
are not allowed to sell their products to any buyers other than the STE.  Thus, necessary
conditions for producers' profit maximization are modified from the Australian-type STE case,
by eliminating condition (18) and all fdhjX  terms from conditions (17) to (21).  
Necessary Conditions for Profit Maximization of the Chinese-Type STE and Producers with the
STE
The Chinese-type STE is an exclusive importer, but has no market power over import and
domestic prices.  The Chinese-type STE’s profit maximizing behavior in country k can be
expressed as:
(22) 
m
k
d
k XX
Max
,
 dkdkkmkkdkkk XTCXWXP −−=π
12
..ts  mkdk XX   ≤
where dkX  and 
m
kX are non-negative variables.  The Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for the
above maximization problem (22) can be expressed as follows:
(23) kdkkk TCP α+≤  , 0  ≥dkX , [ ] 0=−+ kkdkkdk PTCX α
(24) kk W  ≤α , 0  ≥mkX , [ ] 0=− kkmk WX α
(25) mkdk XX   ≤ , 0  ≥kα , [ ] 0=− dkmkk XXα
From conditions (23) to (24), it is clear that the market price is equal to the import price
whenever the STE is active (i.e., 0>dkX  and 0>mkX ) since dkkTC  must be zero.  The Lagrange
multiplier kα  is equal to the market and import prices.   When these prices are positive, dkX  is
equal to mkX .  
Producers are not allowed to export any products in a country with the Chinese-type
STE.  Profit maximization behavior of producers with Chinese-type STE in country k can be
expressed as:
(26) 
fd
kk XY
Max
,
 ( ) fdkdkkkkkkfdkkk XTCYPSYCXP −+−='π
..ts  kfdk YX   ≤
kk YY   ≤
where kY  and 
fd
kX  are non-negative variables.  The Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for the
above maximization problem (26) can be expressed as follows:
(27) fkdkkk TCP α+≤  , 0  ≥fdkX , [ ] 0=−+ kfkdkkfdk PTCX α
(28) 
k
k
kf
kk dY
dCPS δα +≤+   , 0  ≥kY , 

 −−+ fkkk
k
k
k PSdY
dCY αδ =0
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(29) kfdk YX   ≤ , 0  ≥fkα , [ ] 0=− fdkkfk XYα
(30) kk YY   ≤ , 0  ≥kδ , [ ] 0=− kkk YYδ
where fkα  and kδ  are the Lagrange multipliers for the above two constraints in the problem (26),
respectively, with the same meanings as the Australian-type STE case.  
Necessary Conditions for Profit Maximization of Producers with no STEs
Profit maximizing behavior of producers in country i with no STE is expressed in the
same fashion as Maeda, Suzuki, and Kaiser.  Because production and marketing are made by
producer themselves, the term ( ){ }iiii YPSYC +−  is included in the objective function in the
maximization problem (1).  The right-hand side of the first constraint is replaced with iY .  The
new fifth constraint, { }ii YY   ≤ , is added at the problem (1).  Each subscript h is replaced with
subscript i, except for the second and third constraints.  
Accordingly, necessary conditions (2) to (14) are changed as follows:
First, the following two conditions are added. 
(31) 
i
i
i
ii dY
dCPS δα +≤+  , 0  ≥iY , 0=

 −−+ iii
i
i
i PSdY
dCY αδ
(32) ii YY   ≤ , 0 ≥iδ , [ ]iii YY −δ  = 0
Next, each fghX  is replaced with iY  in condition (11).  Each subscript h is replaced with i, except
for conditions (12) and (13).  The meanings of the Lagrange multipliers are the same as those
already mentioned.  
Market Equilibrium Conditions
The market equilibrium condition in country j can be expressed as follows:
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Similarly, the market equilibrium condition in country k with the Chinese-type STE can be
expressed as follows:
(35) ( ){ } fdkdkkkk XXCTPD +≤+   1 , 0  ≥kP , ( ){ }[ ] 0 1 =+−+ kkkfdkdkk CTPDXXP
The Chinese-type STE’s import price in country k is determined at the level that its import
demand is equalized to total supply from abroad.  That is,
(36) ( ) ( )   ∑∑ +++++++≤
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The spatial equilibrium model consists of the above conditions formulated as the MCP.3
The Nash equilibrium solution for these conditions is the spatial equilibrium solution.  The
solution is found by the pathsearch damped Newton method (Ralph; Dirkse and Ferris;
Anstreicher, Lee and Rutherford).  
An Application
Data
The model is applied to a policy simulation of international wheat sector, where STEs play a
dominant role in influencing exports and imports.  Indeed, existing international wheat trade
barriers is one of the most controversial areas of WTO agricultural negotiations.  Most of the
data comes from Maeda, Suzuki, and Kaiser.  Additional data on the mark-ups imposed by the
                                           
3 Harker and Pang, Ferris and Pang, and Ferris and Kanzow present excellent surveys on complementarity problems
including MCP and their applications.
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Japanese Food Agency on in-quota imports are also incorporated.  Five major exporting
countries and areas (United States, Canada, European Union, Australia and Argentina) sharing
about 85 percent of total exports in the international wheat market are included in the model.  In
addition, nine other countries and areas (China, Egypt, India, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, New
Zealand, Nigeria and the former Soviet Union) are included.  The following STEs are included:
AWB (as the Australian-type STE), CWB (as the Canadian-type STE), COFCO and FCI (as the
Chinese-type STEs).  Recall that the Japanese STE’s mark-up is included as an additional
specific duty on the in-quota market.      
Table 1 shows trade and domestic support policies for wheat in each country and area.
Tariff rates and tariff quotas represent levels in 2000 committed by each country under the WTO
agreement.  It is assumed that specific export subsidies in 2000, calculated by dividing the
committed value limit by the committed volume limit, can be used within the committed volume
limit even though WTO agreements require countries to reduce the volume and value of
subsidized export.  China’s trade and domestic support policies represent levels applied in 1998
because it is currently a non-WTO member.  Likewise, Russia’ s figures in 1998 are used for the
former USSR.  Specific duty rates and export subsidies are converted into U.S. dollars by using
exchange rates at the end of 1998.  Instead of the total Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) in
the WTO agreements, we use the unit PSE (converted into U.S. dollars) for wheat as (specific)
production subsidies because we are focusing only on wheat trade.  Although price floors are set
at producer prices, this model sets the price floor at the border price in each country and area by
using the relationship that the border price is equal to the producer price minus unit MPS (or
Market Price Support).   See Maeda, Suzuki, and Kaiser for more explanation on data.  
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This study uses demand and inverse marginal cost functions in each country and area
estimated by Maeda, Suzuki, and Kaiser.  Long-run price elasticities are used for the estimation.
They are shown in table 2 and specified as follows:
(37) ( )NbPaNDDD +=⋅=
(38) ( )dcPFYYAYYY =⋅=
where DD and N are quantity demanded and population, respectively; YY, A, and PF are yield,
cultivated area and marginal cost, respectively; and a, b, c, and d are parameters.  This study also
uses the transportation costs between major ports estimated by Maeda, Suzuki, and Kaiser.  They
are shown in table 3.  
Scenarios
Five scenarios are simulated to measure the effects of STEs on the world wheat trade.  Scenario
1 is the base scenario, where all STEs are active under the committed 2000 levels of trade and
domestic support policies according to the current WTO agricultural agreements shown in table
1.  Trade and domestic policies in China and the former USSR shown in table 1 are also assumed
to remain unchanged. Among countries with no STEs, the three major exporting countries and
areas (United States, European Union, and Argentina) are assumed to behave as Cournot players,
and other seven countries and areas (Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria
and the former Soviet Union) are assumed to behave as price takers in simulation.  This scenario
is indicative of long-term effects of maintaining the current wheat world market situation.  For
simplification, only specific duties are imposed on over-quota imports in Mexico and the United
States.  All levels of other domestic support policies, population, yield and unit transportation
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costs shown in tables 1 to 3 are assumed to remain unchanged.  Population, yield and unit
transportation costs are the same in all scenarios.
In addition to the baseline, there are four scenarios reflecting various options for STEs.
Under Scenario 2, it is assumed that the Canadian STE (CWB) is deregulated to the same level
as the Australian STE (AWB) and all other trade and domestic support policies are the same as
scenario 1.  Canadian producers are allowed to sell their wheat to any buyers other than CWB.
In Scenarios 3, it is assumed that the CWB and AWB are eliminated and all other trade and
domestic support policies are the same as Scenario 1.  Canadian and Australian producers are
assumed to become price takers.  Under Scenario 4, it is assumed that COFCO and FCI are
eliminated and all other trade and domestic support policies are the same as Scenario 1.  That is,
the effects of eliminating export prohibition in China and India are simulated in this scenario.
Scenario 5 is the most extreme one, where it is assumed that all STEs (CWB, AWB, COFCO and
FCI) are eliminated and all other trade and domestic support policies are the same as Scenario 1.
Because we focus on estimating the effects of STEs on world wheat trade in this study, all trade
and domestic support policies other than STEs are kept unchanged for all scenarios.   
The Results
Table 4 shows the spatial equilibrium solution for Scenario 1.  First, Scenario 1 was solved
assuming three different market structures:  (1) a case where producers in all countries and areas
behave as a price taker, (2) a case where producers form a coalition to monopolize the
international markets, and (3) a case where producers behave as a Cournot players.  Although
solutions in the above three cases are not shown, they were not realistic solutions.  For example,
the first and second cases resulted in highly simplistic world trade structures.  The second and
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third cases resulted in extremely high market prices.  As shown in table 4, the solution that was
the closest to the actual world wheat trade structure was the case where producers in Argentina,
European Community and the United States are Cournot players, and producers in the other
seven countries and areas (Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria and the
former Soviet Union) are price takers, except the four countries with STEs (Australia, Canada,
China, and India).  Therefore, we used the fourth case as the basic market structure for
simulating all four scenarios.
The results for the base scenario, where all STEs are active with the committed 2000
levels remaining the same, are displayed in table 4.  In this situation, Canada, the United States,
the European Community, and Australia are the largest net exporters (net exports of 22.3, 13.8,
13.7, and 12.4 million metric tons, respectively).   Total world trade is almost 122 million metric
tons.  Compared to the simulation results of the base scenario by Maeda, Suzuki, and Kaiser's
model with no STEs, Canadian and Australian net exports are larger and net exports of the
United States and the European Community are smaller.4  The fact that some of the discrepancy
in results between the base scenarios of this study and Maeda, Suzuki, and Kaiser’s study are
relatively large suggests that it is important to incorporate the roles of CWB and AWB in the
world wheat trade model.  There is a high degree of price discrimination in Canada where the
differences between domestic and pooled prices are large ($185 and $93).  Although the
European Community has no STE, it is still the world’s third largest net exporter of wheat due
mainly to a high degree of domestic market protection as shown by Maeda, Suzuki, and Kaiser.
On the other hand, the United States has a relatively low degree of protection for its wheat
market.  Second only to Canada in terms of net exports, the United States has one of the lowest
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wheat market prices among all the exporters (almost one-half the market price of Canada and the
European Community).  
The simulation results for Scenario 2 are reported in table 5, where the CWB is no
longer a monopoly buyer of domestic wheat.  Compared to the base scenario, Canada would
reduce exports by 4.9 million metric tons, increase domestic sales by 4.6 million metric tons, and
therefore reduce imports by 3.3 million metric tons.  Total world trade volume would decrease
from 122 to116 million metric tons.  The European Community, Australia, and Argentina would
increase net exports, but only the United States would decrease net exports because decreases in
Canada’s imports results in a decrease in the United States’ exports to Canada.  On the other
hand, importing countries would reduce net imports.     
The simulation results for Scenario 3 are reported in table 6, where the CWB and AWB
are eliminated.  Compared to the base scenario, Canada would reduce exports by 5.2 million
metric tons, increase domestic sales by 4.6 million metric tons, and reduce imports by 3.3 million
metric tons.  Total world trade volume would decrease from 122 to112 million metric tons.   The
largest gains from eliminating the CWB and AWB would go to the European Community, where
net exports increase by 2.7 million metric tons.  Other exporters, such as the United States,
Australia, and Argentina would only have a marginal increase in net exports relative to the base 
scenario levels.  Interestingly, there would be almost no changes in Australia’s situation after
eliminating the AWB since it was already deregulated in 1997 and it is no longer a monopoly
buyer of domestic wheat.  Also, there would only be small differences in Canada’s situation
between Scenarios 2 and 3.   These results imply that being a monopoly wheat buyer is more
important for the exporting STE than being only a monopoly exporter.  
                                                                                                                                            
4 In their base scenario that did not include STEs, Maeda, Suzuki, and Kaiser estimated net exports for Canada and
Australia to be 19.6 and 7.5 million metric tons, respectively, and net exports for the United States and European
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The simulation results for Scenario 4 are reported in table 7, where COFCO and FCI are
eliminated.  This scenario results in almost no changes from the base scenario, except that China
would become an exporter to Japan (2.1 million metric tons) since export prohibition by the
COFCO is eliminated.  Interestingly, the simulation results for Scenario 5 (elimination of all
STEs, or CWB, AWB, COFCO, and FCI) are the same as Scenario 3 results (elimination of
CWB and AWB).  These results imply that export prohibition by COFCO and FCI have almost
no effect on world wheat trade.  
Conclusions
In this paper, a comprehensive multi-regional model with various types of STEs and domestic
and trade policies was developed.  The model was applied to measure the effects of STEs on the
world wheat sector, where trade is significantly influenced by STEs.  The STE model was based
on a trade and policy simulation model by Maeda, Suzuki, and Kaiser, and is a nonlinear
imperfectly competitive spatial equilibrium model formulated as a mixed complementarity
problem (MCP).  Both Canadian (CWB) and Australian (AWB) types of exporting STEs were
included, as were the Chinese and Indian STEs (COFCO and FCI) that act as exclusive importers
and prohibit exports.  The mark-ups imposed by the Japanese STE on imports within tariff-rate
quotas were treated as specific duties in the model.  Finally, the model incorporated the
following trade and domestic support policies: specific duties, ad valorem tariffs, tariff-rate
quotas, export subsidies, production subsidies, production quotas, consumption taxes and price
floors.  
The main empirical findings are as follows.  In the base case where all STEs are active
with the committed 2000 levels remaining the same, Canada, the United States, the European
                                                                                                                                            
Community to be 17.6 and 18.3 million metric tons, respectively.
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Community, and Australia would be the largest net exporters.  By explicitly incorporating the
roles of the CWB and AWB into the world wheat trade model, Canadian and Australian net
exports became larger than previous estimates.  Hence, it is important to include STEs in trade
simulation models.  In the case where CWB is no longer a monopoly buyer of domestic wheat,
compared to the base case, Canada would reduce exports, increase domestic sales, and therefore
reduce imports.  While the European Community, Australia, and Argentina would increase net
exports, only the United States would decrease net exports because decreases in Canada’s
imports results in a decrease in the United States’ exports to Canada.  Under the scenario where
the CWB and AWB are eliminated, Canada would reduce net exports.  The largest gains of
eliminating the CWB and AWB would go to the European Community in the form of increased
exports, while other exporters would have only minor increases in net exports.  Interestingly,
there would be almost no changes in Australia’s situation after eliminating AWB.  This is partly
because the AWB was already deregulated in 1997 and it is no longer a monopoly buyer of
domestic wheat.  Also, there would be only small differences in Canada’s situation between a
case assuming the CWB with no monopoly buying right and a complete elimination of the CWB.
These results imply that being a monopoly buyer is more important for the exporting STE than
only being a monopoly exporter.  The simulation results also revealed that export prohibition by
COFCO and FCI would have almost no effects on world wheat trade.  
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Table 1. Trade and Domestic Support Policies in Each Country and Area
         (Unit: U.S. dollars per metric ton, million metric tons and percents)
Specific Duty Ad Valorem  Tariff Tariff-Rate Quota Specific Duty Ad Valorem  Tariff
Argentina n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.440 n.a. 21.000 n.a.
Australia n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.374 n.a. 10.000 n.a.
Canada 1.241 0.000 0.227 0.000 76.500 14.693 8.851 9.275 n.a. 0.000 n.a.
China n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.000 114.000 0.000 0.000 -36.000 n.a. 17.000 n.a.
Egypt n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.000 5.000 0.000 0.000 48.000 n.a. 10.000 n.a.
EU 0.000 0.000 0.300 113.596 0.000 101.544 13.436 149.588 96.888 9.800 142.294
India n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.000 100.000 0.000 0.000 -66.000 n.a. 0.000 n.a.
Japan 391.003 0.000 5.740 475.779 0.000 0.000 0.000 1275.087 n.a. 5.000 n.a.
South Korea n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.000 1.800 0.000 0.000 454.900 n.a. 10.000 n.a.
Mexico 0.000 50.000 0.605 90.000 67.000 24.183 0.312 47.552 n.a. 0.000 143.500
New Zealand n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n.a. 12.500 n.a.
Nigeria n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.000 150.000 0.000 0.000 349.000 n.a. 5.000 n.a.
U.S. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.500 2.800 25.065 14.522 61.200 n.a. 8.250 94.800
The Former USSR n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.000 5.000 0.000 0.000 39.000 n.a. 0.000 n.a.
Source: Mark-up (specific duty in in-quota market in Japan) from the Japanese Food Agency.  All others from Maeda, Suzuki, and Kaiser.
Note: The tariff rates in countiries and areas with no tariff-rate quotas are shown in columns of over-quota import market.
            Mexico and the U.S. can select the higher of specific duty or ad valorem  tariff in their over-quota import markets. 
            The specific duty rate in the in-quota market in Japan is the upper limit of the mark-up in 2000. 
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Table 2. Demand and Inverse Marginal Cost Functions in Each Country and Area
         (Unit: million people and metric tons per ha)
Per Capita Demand Function Price Elasticity Population Response Function of Cultivated Area Price Elasticity Yield
Argentina d=0.16845-0.00055P -0.32 36.577 L= 0.31628P0.60 0.60 2.553
Australia d=0.34949-0.00068P -0.24 18.701 L= 0.16427P0.90 0.90 2.016
Canada d=0.29091-0.00044P -0.20 30.857 L= 1.08847P0.50 0.50 2.591
China d=0.10074-0.00006P -0.10 1274.107 L=14.91401P0.15 0.15 3.947
Egypt d=0.21283-0.00030P -0.20 67.226 L= 0.18256P0.30 0.30 6.550
EU d=0.28258-0.00057P -0.27 375.049 L= 1.69804P0.50 0.50 5.693
India d=0.07862-0.00009P -0.30 998.056 L= 2.66081P0.45 0.45 2.583
Japan d=0.05419-0.00003P -0.10 126.505 L= 0.00454P0.52 0.52 3.450
South Korea d=0.11786-0.00038P -0.40 46.48 L= 0.00007P0.45 0.45 5.000
Mexico d=0.07169-0.00014P -0.30 97.365 L= 0.05606P0.55 0.55 4.429
New Zealand d=0.16803-0.00024P -0.22 3.828 L= 0.00114P0.80 0.80 5.000
Nigeria d=0.00820-0.00002P -0.93 108.945 L= 0.01421P0.20 0.20 1.286
U.S. d=0.16994-0.00042P -0.35 276.218 L= 1.55619P0.60 0.60 2.873
The Former USSR d=0.47948-0.00055P -0.25 291.587 L=13.69191P0.23 0.23 1.575
Source: Maeda, Suzuki,and Kaiser.
Country or Area
Demand Function Inverse Marginal Cost Function
Table 3. Unit Transportation Cost of Grains among Countries and Areas (Unit: U.S. dollars per metric ton)
   From       To Argentina (Buenos Aires)
Australia 
(Sydney)
Canada 
(Montreal) China (Shanghai) Egypt (Port Said) EU (Rotterdam) India (Mumbai) Japan (Tokyo)
South Korea 
(Pusan)
Mexico 
(Tampico)
New Zealand 
(Wellington) Nigeria (Lagos)
U.S. (New 
Orleans)
The Former 
USSR (Sankt 
Petersburg)
Argentina (Buenos 
Aires)
0.000 17.580 15.781 27.355 17.648 15.539 20.236 26.137 26.943 15.730 14.617 10.547 15.249 18.710
Australia (Sydney) 17.580 0.000 26.715 11.351 20.329 28.352 14.745 10.643 10.439 22.508 3.029 22.442 22.336 31.773
Canada (Montreal) 15.781 26.715 0.000 28.916 12.480 8.062 19.945 26.779 27.833 8.219 23.821 12.571 7.521 9.633
China (Shanghai) 27.355 11.351 28.916 0.000 17.759 25.782 11.439 2.568 1.171 24.708 13.130 25.127 24.537 28.923
Egypt (Port Said) 17.648 20.329 12.480 17.759 0.000 8.023 7.464 19.393 18.509 16.590 22.545 12.270 15.887 10.907
EU (Rotterdam) 15.539 28.352 8.062 25.782 8.023 0.000 15.487 27.416 26.622 12.600 27.769 10.221 11.895 2.963
India (Mumbai) 20.236 14.745 19.945 11.439 7.464 15.487 0.000 13.073 12.098 24.054 16.960 17.531 23.351 18.589
Japan (Tokyo) 26.137 10.643 26.779 2.568 19.393 27.416 13.073 0.000 1.676 22.572 12.353 26.755 22.400 30.715
South Korea (Pusan) 26.943 10.439 27.833 1.171 18.509 26.622 12.098 1.676 0.000 23.603 13.005 25.826 23.400 29.663
Mexico (Tampico) 15.730 22.508 8.219 24.708 16.590 12.600 24.054 22.572 23.603 0.000 19.614 14.747 1.796 18.491
New Zealand 
(Wellington)
14.617 3.029 23.821 13.130 22.545 27.769 16.960 12.353 13.005 19.614 0.000 23.892 19.442 30.923
Nigeria (Lagos) 10.547 22.442 12.571 25.127 12.270 10.221 17.531 26.755 25.826 14.747 23.892 0.000 14.100 13.110
U.S. (New Orleans) 15.249 22.336 7.521 24.537 15.887 11.895 23.351 22.400 23.400 1.796 19.442 14.100 0.000 14.424
The Former USSR 
(Sankt Petersburg)
18.710 31.773 9.633 28.923 10.907 2.963 18.589 30.715 29.663 18.491 30.923 13.110 14.424 0.000
Source: Maeda, Suzuki, and Kaiser. 
Note: Selected ports in parentheses.
Table 4. Spatial Equilibrium Solution for Scenario 1 (Unit: million metric tons and U.S. dollars per metric ton)
  From        To Argentina Australia Canada China Egypt EU India Japan South       Korea Mexico New       Zealand Nigeria U.S. The Former USSR
Argentina n.a. n.a. 0.056 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.216 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Australia n.a. n.a. 0.170 n.a. n.a. 0.204 n.a. 0.378 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Canada n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.019 n.a. 0.323 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
China n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Egypt n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.626 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
EU n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.465 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
India n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
South      Korea n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.006 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mexico n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.032 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
New        
Zealand n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.124 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Nigeria n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
U.S. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.077 n.a. 0.489 n.a. 0.605 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
The Former 
USSR n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Argentina n.a. 0.010 0.626 0.064 0.048 2.568 5.010
Australia 0.446 n.a. 0.970 0.782 0.770 0.080 4.095 6.084
Canada 0.580 0.210 n.a. 1.219 6.685 0.511 0.063 6.441 10.489
China n.a.
Egypt n.a.
EU 1.283 0.619 2.012 1.955 n.a. 1.152 0.304 0.091 9.780 16.861
India n.a.
Japan n.a.
South      Korea n.a.
Mexico n.a.
New        
Zealand n.a.
Nigeria n.a.
U.S. 1.290 0.702 2.043 1.794 13.073 1.215 0.100 0.341 n.a. 14.948
The Former 
USSR n.a.
3.599 1.541 4.281 0.000 6.564 20.840 0.000 3.659 3.712 0.909 0.382 0.341 22.884 53.392
0.404 3.857 2.050 111.332 3.822 42.408 53.786 0.770 0.000 4.198 0.132 0.064 11.677 68.102
4.003 5.398 6.331 111.332 10.386 63.248 53.786 4.429 3.712 5.107 0.514 0.405 34.510 121.494
73.404 73.493 185.026 105.994 108.859 181.899 162.746 519.256 86.960 125.725 115.900 157.306 94.800 109.378
n.a. n.a. 108.577 n.a. n.a. 113.600 n.a. 0.000 n.a. 38.047 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Argentina Australia Canada China Egypt EU India Japan South      Korea Mexico New        Zealand Nigeria U.S.
The Former 
USSR
0.404 3.339 n.a. 111.332 3.822 42.408 53.786 0.770 0.000 4.198 0.132 0.064 11.677 68.102
n.a. 0.518 2.050 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
8.598 13.979 26.540 0.000 1.626 34.522 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.032 0.124 0.000 36.677 0.000
4.999 12.438 22.259 0.000 -4.938 13.682 0.000 -3.659 -3.706 -0.877 -0.258 -0.341 13.793 -53.392
9.002 17.836 28.590 111.332 5.448 76.930 53.786 0.770 0.006 4.230 0.256 0.064 48.354 68.102
9.002 17.836 28.590 111.332 5.448 96.888 53.786 0.770 0.006 4.230 0.256 0.064 52.777 68.102
n.a. 73.493 93.476 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a. 14.693 n.a. n.a. 101.544 n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.135 n.a. n.a. 25.065 n.a.
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 49.135 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note: Blank spaces indicate zero.
a. Shadow price for the right to export to the in-quota maraket.
b. Shadow price for the right to export within the upper limit of subsidied quontity exported.
c. Shadow price for the right to produce within the production quota.
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Table 5. Spatial Equilibrium Solution for Scenario 2 (Unit: million metric tons and U.S. dollars per metric ton)
  From        To Argentina Australia Canada China Egypt EU India Japan South       Korea Mexico New       Zealand Nigeria U.S. The Former USSR
Argentina n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.220 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Australia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.248 n.a. 0.380 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Canada n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.027 n.a. 0.286 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
China n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Egypt n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.626 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
EU n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.476 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
India n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
South      Korea n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.006 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mexico n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.032 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
New        
Zealand n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.128 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Nigeria n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
U.S. n.a. n.a. 0.227 n.a. n.a. 0.025 n.a. 0.499 n.a. 0.605 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
The Former 
USSR n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Argentina n.a. 0.004 0.638 0.078 0.048 2.650 5.094
Australia 0.458 n.a. 0.978 0.892 0.780 0.080 4.150 6.132
Canada 0.401 0.084 n.a. 1.050 4.839 0.354 0.054 5.444 9.110
China n.a.
Egypt n.a.
EU 1.333 0.634 0.758 1.997 n.a. 1.197 0.304 0.093 10.050 17.202
India n.a.
Japan n.a.
South      Korea n.a.
Mexico n.a.
New        
Zealand n.a.
Nigeria n.a.
U.S. 1.340 0.717 1.836 13.685 1.260 0.102 n.a. 15.288
The Former 
USSR n.a.
3.532 1.439 0.985 0.000 6.499 19.716 0.000 3.653 3.669 0.909 0.377 0.000 22.294 52.826
0.420 3.945 6.602 111.332 3.846 42.969 53.786 0.770 0.000 4.198 0.132 0.068 11.946 68.327
3.952 5.384 7.587 111.332 10.345 62.685 53.786 4.423 3.669 5.107 0.509 0.068 34.240 121.153
75.664 74.574 91.070 105.994 111.034 184.305 162.746 521.430 89.262 125.725 118.074 340.613 96.992 111.521
n.a. n.a. 65.308 n.a. n.a. 113.600 n.a. 0.000 n.a. 38.047 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Argentina Australia Canada China Egypt EU India Japan South      Korea Mexico New        Zealand Nigeria U.S.
The Former 
USSR
0.420 3.436 5.944 111.332 3.846 42.969 53.786 0.770 0.000 4.198 0.132 0.068 11.946 68.327
n.a. 0.509 0.658 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
8.732 14.098 21.649 0.000 1.626 34.044 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.032 0.128 0.000 35.584 0.000
5.200 12.659 20.664 0.000 -4.873 14.328 0.000 -3.653 -3.663 -0.877 -0.249 0.000 13.290 -52.826
9.152 18.043 28.251 111.332 5.472 77.013 53.786 0.770 0.006 4.230 0.260 0.068 47.530 68.327
9.152 18.043 28.251 111.332 5.472 96.888 53.786 0.770 0.006 4.230 0.260 0.068 52.777 68.327
n.a. 74.574 91.070 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a. 14.693 n.a. n.a. 101.544 n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.312 n.a. n.a. 25.065 n.a.
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 49.135 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note: Blank spaces indicate zero.
a. Shadow price for the right to export to the in-quota maraket.
b. Shadow price for the right to export within the upper limit of subsidied quontity exported.
c. Shadow price for the right to produce within the production quota.
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Table 6. Spatial Equilibrium Solution for Scenario 3 and 5 (Unit: million metric tons and U.S. dollars per metric ton)
  From        To Argentina Australia Canada China Egypt EU India Japan South       Korea Mexico New       Zealand Nigeria U.S. The Former USSR
Argentina n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.182 n.a. 0.008 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Australia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.306 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Canada n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
China n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Egypt n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
EU n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.265 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
India n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
South      Korea n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mexico n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
New        
Zealand n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Nigeria n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
U.S. n.a. n.a. 0.227 n.a. n.a. 0.119 n.a. 0.289 n.a. 0.605 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
The Former 
USSR n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Argentina n.a. 0.412 1.020 0.018 0.006 3.018 3.868
Australia n.a. 1.414 1.358 0.250 7.616
Canada n.a. 0.444 20.878
China n.a.
Egypt n.a.
EU 1.549 0.631 0.732 1.775 n.a. 1.140 0.293 0.052 10.439 16.000
India n.a.
Japan n.a.
South      Korea n.a.
Mexico n.a.
New        
Zealand n.a.
Nigeria n.a.
U.S. 1.556 0.713 1.614 15.194 1.203 0.060 n.a. 14.086
The Former 
USSR n.a.
3.105 1.344 0.959 0.000 5.215 16.515 0.000 3.868 3.719 0.898 0.368 0.000 21.517 54.832
0.632 4.043 6.654 111.332 5.350 44.571 53.786 0.760 0.006 4.219 0.185 0.068 12.335 67.521
3.737 5.387 7.613 111.332 10.565 61.086 53.786 4.628 3.725 5.117 0.553 0.068 33.852 122.353
85.386 74.306 89.122 105.994 99.616 191.175 162.746 475.952 86.299 124.928 77.335 340.613 100.143 103.952
n.a. n.a. 63.360 n.a. n.a. 113.600 n.a. 0.000 n.a. 37.649 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Argentina Australia Canada China Egypt EU India Japan South      Korea Mexico New        Zealand Nigeria U.S.
The Former 
USSR
0.632 4.043 6.654 111.332 5.350 44.571 53.786 0.760 0.006 4.219 0.185 0.068 12.335 67.521
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
8.532 13.944 21.322 0.000 0.000 32.876 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 35.666 0.000
5.427 12.600 20.363 0.000 -5.215 16.361 0.000 -3.868 -3.719 -0.898 -0.368 0.000 14.149 -54.832
9.164 17.987 27.976 111.332 5.350 77.447 53.786 0.760 0.006 4.219 0.185 0.068 48.001 67.521
9.164 17.987 27.976 111.332 5.350 96.888 53.786 0.760 0.006 4.219 0.185 0.068 52.777 67.521
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a. 14.693 n.a. n.a. 101.544 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.000 n.a. n.a. 25.065 n.a.
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 49.135 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note: Blank spaces indicate zero.
a. Shadow price for the right to export to the in-quota maraket.
b. Shadow price for the right to export within the upper limit of subsidied quontity exported.
c. Shadow price for the right to produce within the production quota.
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Table 7. Spatial Equilibrium Solution for Scenario 4 (Unit: million metric tons and U.S. dollars per metric ton)
  From        To Argentina Australia Canada China Egypt EU India Japan South       Korea Mexico New       Zealand Nigeria U.S. The Former USSR
Argentina n.a. n.a. 0.062 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.160 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Australia n.a. n.a. 0.166 n.a. n.a. 0.192 n.a. 0.318 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Canada n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.077 n.a. 0.266 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
China n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.104 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Egypt n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.010 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
EU n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.406 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
India n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
South      Korea n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.006 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mexico n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
New        
Zealand n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.022 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Nigeria n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
U.S. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.030 n.a. 0.430 n.a. 0.605 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
The Former 
USSR n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Argentina n.a. 0.392 0.076 0.036 2.668 5.112
Australia 0.440 n.a. 0.720 0.768 0.764 0.066 4.095 6.048
Canada 0.587 0.196 n.a. 0.978 6.728 0.517 0.050 6.508 10.546
China n.a.
Egypt n.a.
EU 1.278 0.597 2.011 1.704 n.a. 1.148 0.294 0.077 9.781 16.828
India n.a.
Japan n.a.
South      Korea n.a.
Mexico n.a.
New        
Zealand n.a.
Nigeria n.a.
U.S. 1.285 0.680 2.041 1.543 13.094 1.211 0.087 n.a. 14.913
The Former 
USSR n.a.
3.590 1.473 4.280 0.000 5.337 20.889 0.000 3.722 3.716 0.899 0.316 0.000 23.052 53.447
0.417 3.948 2.056 110.785 5.301 42.383 53.786 0.767 0.000 4.219 0.210 0.068 11.677 68.079
4.007 5.421 6.336 110.785 10.638 63.272 53.786 4.489 3.716 5.118 0.526 0.068 34.510 121.526
73.177 71.885 184.890 112.784 95.959 181.790 162.746 506.356 86.729 124.928 103.000 340.613 94.800 109.163
n.a. n.a. 108.848 n.a. n.a. 113.600 n.a. 0.000 n.a. 37.649 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Argentina Australia Canada China Egypt EU India Japan South      Korea Mexico New        Zealand Nigeria U.S.
The Former 
USSR
0.417 3.452 n.a. 110.785 5.301 42.383 53.786 0.767 0.000 4.219 0.210 0.068 11.677 68.079
n.a. 0.496 2.056 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
8.506 13.577 26.453 2.104 0.010 34.124 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.022 0.000 35.919 0.000
4.916 12.104 22.173 2.104 -5.327 13.235 0.000 -3.722 -3.710 -0.899 -0.294 0.000 12.867 -53.447
8.923 17.525 28.509 112.889 5.311 76.507 53.786 0.767 0.006 4.219 0.232 0.068 47.596 68.079
8.923 17.525 28.509 112.889 5.311 96.888 53.786 0.767 0.006 4.219 0.232 0.068 52.777 68.079
n.a. 71.885 92.905 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a. 14.693 n.a. n.a. 101.544 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.000 n.a. n.a. 25.065 n.a.
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 49.135 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note: Blank spaces indicate zero.
a. Shadow price for the right to export to the in-quota maraket.
b. Shadow price for the right to export within the upper limit of subsidied quontity exported.
c. Shadow price for the right to produce within the production quota.
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